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PROSECUTION OF MOTHERS OF DRUG-EXPOSED BABIES:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND CRIMINAL THEORY
DORETrA MASSARDO MCGINNISt
During the late 1980s, a new prosecutorial trend developed:
women who had used drugs during pregnancy and subsequently
delivered drug-exposed babies were charged with a variety of crimes
including criminal neglect,1 delivery of drugs to a minor,2 and
involuntary manslaughter.3 It was estimated that eighteen such
cases were pending nationwide as of October 1989, 4 representing
an abrupt increase in the wake of the Supreme Court's July 1989
decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.5 Early in 1990
the American Civil Liberties Union counted at least thirty-five cases
across the country as this prosecutorial trend continued into the
new decade.
6
These prosecutions uniformly involve the application of laws
previously applied to redress offenses committed against children
t A.B. 1985 Harvard University;J.D. Candidate 1991, University of Pennsylvania.
Thanks to Barbara B. Woodhouse, Stephen J. Morse, Judith Bernstein-Baker, and
MartinJ. Doyle. This Comment is dedicated to David E. McGinnis.
1 In 1986, Pamela Rae Stewart of El Cajon, Cal., was charged with criminal neglect
after her alleged drug use during pregnancy and failure to take proper prenatal
precautions resulted in the death of her child. Charges were eventually dropped. See
Note, Of Woman's First Disobedience: Forsaking a Duty of Care to Her Fetus-Is This a
Mother's Crime? 53 BROOKLYN L. REv. 807,807-08 (1987) (discussing People v. Stewar
tried in the San Diego Municipal Court). Pamela Stewart was the first American
woman to be criminally charged with fetal neglect. See Sherman, Keeping Babies Free
of Drugs, Natl L.J., Oct. 16, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
2 Women charged with delivering drugs through their umbilical cords include
Jennifer Johnson of Sanford, Fla., see infra notes 11-12 and accompanying text,
Josephine Pellegrini of Brockton, Mass., see Coakley & Hart, MotherIndicted on Cocaine
Charge, Boston Globe, Sept. 27, 1989, at 31, col. 1, Kimberly Hardy of Muskegon
County, Mich., see infra note 13 and accompanying text, and Lynn Bremer, also of
Muskegon County, see Hoffman, Pregnan4 Addicted-And Guilty?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19,
1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 35.
3 Melanie Green of Rockford, Ill., was charged with involuntary manslaughter in
1989. See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
4 See Foster, Fetal Endangerment Cases Increase Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 10,
1989, at 8, col. 2. By October 1989, cases had been brought in Arizona, California,
Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, Ohio, and South Carolina. See id.
5 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989); see McNamara, Fetal Endangerment Cases on the Rise,
Boston Globe, Oct. 3, 1989, at 1, col. 2 (linking the increase in prosecutions to a
heightened interest in fetal rights following Webster).
6 See Paltrow, When Becoming Pregnant is a Crime, 9 CRIM.JUST. ETHIcS 41 (1990).
Women have been recently prosecuted in Kentucky and North Carolina, see Hoffman,
supra note 2, at 35, as well as in the states indicated supra notes 2-4.
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after birth. Arguably, prosecutors have misconstrued existing
statutes to create new offenses in contravention of legislative intent,
while denying defendants the due process requirements of notice
and fair warning. Several state legislatures have passed or are
considering legislation specifically aimed at prohibiting and
punishing the use of illicit drugs by pregnant women. Passage of
such legislation will likely be accompanied by clear expressions of
legislative intent, and potential defendants will likely be granted
notice and fair warning. Other potential constitutional problems,
however, will remain. The: fundamental right to bear a child will be
denied to a class of women-drug addicts-based on their status as
addicts and the effects that their addictive behaviors are likely to
have on their children. The rights of privacy and reproductive
freedom currently accorded all women may be further eroded.
Such restrictions may, however, be found constitutional if courts
accept the view that fetal. rights outweigh women's rights in the
context of a pregnant woman's behavior likely to cause fetal harm.
Even if the current constitutional defects are remedied through
the passage of narrowly tailored statutes and increased recognition
of fetal rights, prosecutions of pregnant drug users still cannot be
justified under prevailing theories of criminal law. These prosecu-
tions may involve punishing women on two inappropriate grounds:
their involuntary, addictive behavior and their status as pregnant
addicts. Involuntary behavior typically does notjustify punishment,
and status crimes are categorically prohibited. The involuntary
nature of addiction makes it unlikely that these prosecutions will
have any significant deterrent effect. In the absence of general
deterrence, these prosecutions will fail to benefit potential defen-
dants, their children, or society as a whole. In fact, it is likely that
criminogenic effects7 will ensue: crimes associated with the evasion
of these prosecutions may increase; respect for the legal system may
be diminished as the public observes the spectacle of the state
prosecuting poor, disenfranchised drug users while the wealthy
avoid prosecution and enjoy the benefits of discriminatory law
enforcement; prosecutorial resources may be diverted from more
effective uses (such as the prosecution of drug suppliers and
dealers) to the prosecution of women whose children are already
permanently drug-affected and who require medical, not penal,
attention. Drug-addicted women and their actual and potential
See infra text following note 107.
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children need medical help which the criminal justice system is
neither designed nor equipped to provide.
In May 1989, Melanie Green of Rockford, Illinois became the
first woman in the United States to be charged with manslaughter
for the death of a baby who died (after being born alive) of
complications resulting from prenatal maternal cocaine use.
8
Green was also charged with delivering drugs to a minor.9 A
Winnebago County grand jury refused to indict Green and all
charges were dropped.1'
In July 1989, the Seminole County Court in Sanford, Florida
convicted Jennifer Johnson of delivering drugs to a minor.
11
Johnson had used cocaine during her pregnancy and her child was
born with traces of the drug in his system. An attempt to convict
Johnson of child abuse was unsuccessful. The prosdcutor ultimately
applied a statute typically used against drug traffickers. Johnson
was sentenced to fifteen years of probation, attendance at a drug
rehabilitation program, and mandatory prenatal supervision should
she become pregnant again.
12
In August 1989, Kimberly Hardy of Muskegon County, Michigan
gave birth to a son who tested positive for drugs. She was subse-
quently arrested and charged with delivering crack to her son
through her umbilical cord. The Michigan Court of Appeals is
currently deciding whether her case should be tried in a lower state
court or dismissed.13
8 See Reardon, Grand Juiy Won't Indict Mother In Baby's Drug Death, Chicago
Tribune, May 27, 1989, at 1, col. 5. Green was charged under the Illinois involuntary
manslaughter statute. See Logli, Drugs in the Womb: The Newest Battlefield in the War
on Drugs, 9 CRIM.JUsT. ETHIcs 23, 24 (1990). The complaint read in part: "Melanie
Green committed the offense of involuntary manslaughter in that she... killed her
child ... by recklessly performing the act of ingesting a controlled substance
containing cocaine while pregnant with [the child] .... " Id. at 29 n.9.
9 This charge was brought under Illinois' drug delivery statute, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
56 1/2, para. 1407 (1987). See Logli, supra note 8, at 29 n.10. The complaint read
in part: "Melanie Green committed the offense of violation of the controlled
substances act in that she, a person over eighteen years of age, delivered to a person
under eighteen years of age a controlled substance containing cocaine, to wit: while
pregnant.., she knowingly ingested a controlled substance containing cocaine which
was thereby delivered to the bloodstream and body of her fetus .... " Id.
10 See Reardon, supra note 8.
1 See Paltrow, supra note 6, at 42, 46 n.13 (discussing State v.Johnson, tried in the
Seminole County Court).12 See Linn, The Corruption ofMotherhood, Phila. Inquirer, Sept. 17,1989, Magazine,
at 14.
13 See Hoffman, supra note 2, at 34-35.
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This Comment will first discuss the constitutional ramifications
of these prosecutions. It will then analyze the prosecutions in the
context of criminal legal theory. Finally, the prosecutions will be
discussed in the context of the national debates on abortion and
drug abuse. This Comment concludes that the criminal justice
system is ill-suited to intervene in the complex medical and
sociological problems associated with drug use and pregnancy
which may be more effectively and humanely addressed by drug
treatment programs for pregnant addicts.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The constitutional concerns raised by the prosecution of
mothers who have delivered drug-exposed babies are twofold. First,
the unforeseeable application against pregnant drug abusers who
harm their fetuses of statutes usually construed to protect live-born
children does not satisfy the requirements of due process. Prosecu-
tors have crafted new offenses that are not sanctioned by state
legislatures, and potential defendants are subjected to criminal
liability without notice or fair warning. Second, such prosecutions
further expand fetal rights at an impermissible cost to women's
rights. This section evaluates these two aspects of the dubious
constitutionality of the recent prosecutions.
A. Due Process Violations
Prior to the spate of prosecutions at issue here, statutes
criminalizing child abuse, manslaughter, or the delivery of drugs to
a minor had been used against adults who abused, killed or sold
drugs to children, not against mothers whose prenatal drug use
caused fetal harm. 14 The statutes typically use such terms as
"child" or "person";15 their application in cases involving live-born
children harmed after birth fell within the bounds of legislative
intent 16 and avoided delicate determinations concerning the
beginnings of "personhood."17 Endorsement by the courts of
14 For example, the drug-delivery statute used against Jennifer Johnson had
previously been used against drug dealers. See Chavkin, Help, Don'tJai4 Addicted
Mother, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1989, at A21, col. 2.
15 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13(1)(a)(3)(c) (West 1976) (criminalizing
delivery of drugs to "a person under the age of 18 years"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56
1/2, para. 1407 (Smith-Hurd 1985 & Supp. 1990) (same).
16 A child born alive is indisputably a person under 18 years of age, regardless of
whether a child conceived but not yet born is such a person.
17 See infra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing how prosecutors have
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prosecutors' applications of such statutes to mothers who have
harmed their fetuses by using drugs during pregnancy may,
however, constitute the impermissible judicial creation of new
offenses. The legislature, not the courts, should create new
offenses.1 8  In addition, the prosecuted mothers were not on
notice that their activity was a crime vis-4-vis their fetuses. This
unforeseeable classification of certain acts as offenses is a violation
of the constitutional requirements of notice and fair warning. The
requirements of due process that (1) the legislature, not the courts,
define crimes and (2) potential defendants be granted notice or fair
warning that their conduct is criminal are considered below.
1. Legislative Definitions of Crimes
The Supreme Court of California provided an instructive
discussion of the role of the legislature in defining crimes in the
landmark case of Keeler v. Superior Court.19  The defendant,
charged with murder in connection with the stillbirth of a baby that
had suffered a fractured skull in utero, had beaten the child's
mother during the eighth month of pregnancy with the intent to kill
the fetus.
The California court began by noting the language of the state's
murder statute, which proscribed the "unlawful and malicious killing
of a human being .... .20 Examining legislative intent, the court
concluded that a fetus was not a human being within the meaning
of the statute; the defendant, therefore, was not guilty of mur-
der.21 The Keeler court stated that "the power to define
crimes and fix penalties is vested exclusively in the legislative
branch.... [T]he courts cannot go so far as to create an offense by
enlarging a statute.., or by giving the terms used false or unusual
meanings." 22 Given the codification of criminal law in the United
States and the attendant demise of common law crimes, these
statements describe the general American rule, not simply the law
of California. 23 The California state legislature responded to the
evaded making "personhood" determinations by contending that drugs can be
delivered through the uncut umbilical cord after birth).18 See infra notes 31-41 and accompanying text (surveying several states' legislative
reactions to these prosecutions and discussing possible legislative solutions).
19 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970).
20 Id. at 624, 470 P.2d at 619, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 483 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 187 (1872) (amended 1970) (emphasis added)).
21 See id. at 623, 470 P.2d at 618, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
22 Id. at 631-32, 470 P.2d at 624-25, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 488-89 (citations omitted).
2S See S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
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Keeler decision by revising the state's murder statute to encompass
feticide.
24
Fair application of a statute in a manner consistent with
legislative intent requires an inquiry into the meaning of the
statutory terms. In Keeler, for example, the court had to determine
whether a fetus came within the statutory term "human being."
One issue raised by the current prosecutions of mothers who bear
drug-exposed babies is whether the fetuses are "children" or
"persons" within the meaning of the applied statutes. For example,
the drug delivery complaint against Melanie Green characterized her
fetus as a person under eighteen years of age. 25 Several prosecu-
tors have evaded considerations of legislative intent by arguing that
drugs were delivered to a child born alive via the umbilical cord in
the moments before the cord was clamped.26 If a fetus was not
intended by the legislature to come within the ambit of a statutory
term such as "person," this application of the statute to cases of
fetal harm may constitute the creation of a new offense by enlarging
the statute to encompass harm to fetuses as well as to persons, or by
according an unusual or unintended meaning to the term "person."
Either of these consequences would constitute prosecutorial
usurpation of the legislature's power to define crimes.
PROCESSES 354 (4th ed. 1983).
24 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988).
25 See supra note 9.
26 See, e.g., Paltrow, supra note 6, at 42 (describing the prosecutor's argument in
the Johnson case); Hoffman, supra note 2, at 34 (describing the prosecutor's
contention in the Hardy case and noting that such arguments "avoid ... debates over
when the fetus becomes a person"). The personhood debate, however, is unavoidable
when drug exposure occurred well before birth, so that drug metabolites could not
be passed through the umbilical cord after birth.
Dr. Ira J. Chasnoff, founder and president of the National Association of
Perinatal Addiction Research and Education, questions the medical validity of the
theory that cocaine can be passed through the umbilical cord immediately before it
is clamped. He has said, "Good ethics and good law have to be based on good
science ... and we just don't have that kind of data." Id. at 35.
It should be noted that finding that a fetus is a person within the meaning of a
state statute could be constitutional, and would contravene neither Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (which held that a fetus is not a person under the fourteenth
amendment) nor Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989)
(which left Roe's fourteenth amendment holding intact). See infra text accompanying
notes 42-45. Such a finding, though constitutional, may still be violative of legislative
intent.
This Comment will presume that the state legislatures in question did not intend
to include fetuses within the ambits of the statutes currently being used to prosecute
pregnant drug users.
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While an analysis of the legislative history of the relevant
statutes in each state where prosecutions have occurred is beyond
the scope of this Comment, it is apparent that prosecutors have
applied laws in novel ways. In the Green case, prosecutor Paul Logli
"sought to apply the involuntary manslaughter statute because there
[were] no laws in Illinois directly applicable to the case." 27 Logli
himself has speculated that the grand jury failed to indict Green
because "the jurors were uncomfortable with the use of statutes that
were not intended to be used in these circumstances." 28 Such
prosecutorial initiatives may contravene legislative intent and
ostensibly create new offenses of fetal harm. 29 Creation of offens-
es is a role that is properly assumed by the legislature, not prosecu-
tors.3
0
It is possible that state legislatures will respond to the courts'
failure to convict pregnant drug users under existing statutes by
passing laws that are more narrowly tailored to prosecutorial goals.
The statutory definition of a child or person may be expanded to
include fetuses, 1 or the definition of abuse or neglect may be
27 Wilkerson,Juy in Illinois Refuses to Charge Mother in DrugDeath of Newborn, N.Y.
Times, May 27, 1989, at A1O, col. 5.
28 Logli, supra note 8, at 24.
29 With regard to the current spate of prosecutions, it has been argued that state
laws have been construed in flagrant violation of legislative intent. Walter Connolly,
Jr., a lawyer representing the National Association for Perinatal Addiction Research
and Education, states that "[t]he law is clear that it is unconstitutional to prosecute
women who use drugs when pregnant when the sole issue is harm to the fetus under
existing state law." Foster, supra note 4, at 8, col. 2. Harvard law professor Alan
Dershowitz notes that "Massachusetts has a statute saying it's a crime to transmit
drugs .... Every legislator voted for that. No one dreamed it would be applied to
women taking drugs while pregnant." Id.
30 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
31 In order for a statute to be used with a sound legal basis against a woman
whose prenatal behavior harms her fetus, the statute should include language or
legislative history that supports such application; merely stating that the law
encompasses fetal harm is insufficient, as is shown by the case of People v. Stewart. See
supra note 1. Stewart was charged with criminal neglect under a statute that makes
it a misdemeanor for a parent to "willfully omit[] without lawful excuse, to furnish
necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care for his
or her child" and states that a "child conceived but not yet born is an existing person
insofar as this section is concerned." CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988). Although
Stewart had allegedly injured a "child conceived but not yet born," charges were
dismissed for failure to state a charge: the judge ruled that the state legislature
intended the law to be used only to require child support. See A Judge Dismissed
Thursday the Criminal Prosecution ofa MotherAccused of Contributing to HerBaby's Death,
UPI, Feb. 26, 1987, AM cycle, Domestic News (LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file).
Stewart's attorney, Lynn Paltrow of the ACLU, argued that the statute was intended
to require fathers to pay for pregnancy care. See id. The statute had been amended
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amended to mention explicitly maternal drug use during pregnancy.
To date, most legislative responses have been in the area of civil,
rather than criminal, law. After the refusal of an Illinois grand jury
to indict Melanie Green for manslaughter after her newborn died
of complications stemming from maternal drug use, the state legisla-
ture expanded the statutory definition of a neglected or abused
minor to include "any newborn infant whose blood or urine
contains any amount of a controlled substance ... or a metabolite
of a controlled substance .... .32 The amended statute facilitates
judicial jurisdiction over drug-exposed newborns and their removal
from their mothers.35 Several other states have amended or
enacted laws under which a child who is born drug-dependent or
drug-exposed is considered to be abused or neglected.3 4 The
Pennsylvania legislature is considering similar legislation. 35 It has
been suggested that "states could promote the unborn's potentiality
for life by outlawing fetus endangerment, abandonment, neglect and
nonsupport. " 36 Such legislation would parallel the protections
commonly in place for live-born children.
3 7
The Illinois legislature is also considering a criminal law
response to drug use by pregnant women: House Bill 2835 would
establish a new criminal statute prohibiting "conduct injurious to a
newborn."3 8 The Bill states in part:
in 1925 to include fathers within its ambit. See id.
32 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 802-3(c) (1989); see also Logli, supra note 8, at 27
(supporting the proposition that the statute was responsively amended).
33 See Logli, supra note 8, at 27.
34 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503(9)(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 587-2 (1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-3.1 (West Supp. 1990); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 1101(4) (West 1987). Seegenerally Development in the Law, Fetal Drug
or Alcohol Addiction Syndrome: A Case of Prenatal Child Abuse?, 25 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
223, 224 & n.7 (1989) (listing amendments to Oklahoma and Florida child abuse and
neglect statutes). For a discussion of state court action in the absence of explicit
statutory directives, see id. at 224-29.
35 See GEN. ASSEMBLY OF PA., SENATE BILL No. 575, § 3 (1989) (proposing an
expansion of Pennsylvania's definition of child abuse to include a "substance-abused
child," defined as "a child who is born with fetal alcohol syndrome, neonatal
abstinence syndrome or the systemic presence of a substance listed in ... 'The
Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act'").
36 Parness & Pritchard, To Be or Not To Be: Protecting the Unborn's Potentiality of
Life, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 257,270 (1982) (footnotes omitted); see also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 270 (West 1988) (making it a misdemeanor for a parent to fail to provide necessities
for a minor child, including "a child conceived but not yet born").37 See Parness & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 270 nn.106-09 (citing California child
endangerment, abandonment, neglect, and nonsupport statutes).
ss See Logli, supra note 8, at 27.
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Any woman who is pregnant and without a prescription knowingly
or intentionally uses a dangerous drug or a narcotic drug and at
the conclusion of her pregnancy delivers a newborn child, and
such child shows signs of narcotic or dangerous drug exposure or
addiction, or the presence of a narcotic or dangerous drug in the
child's blood or urine, commits the offense of conduct injurious
to a newborn.
39
The new crime would be a felony punishable by probation or a
prison term of one to three years.4 0 Defenses include a woman's
lack of knowledge that she is pregnant, or her rehabilitation and
discontinuation of drug use during the first twelve weeks of
pregnancy.
4 1
The passage of legislation criminalizing certain maternal
behavior during pregnancy and imposing liability for the harmful
effects of such behavior on children would satisfy the due process
requirement that the legislature, rather than the courts, define
criminal offenses. Substantively, it appears that such legislation
would be constitutional. While the Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade42 held that a fetus is not a person within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment, it "did not prohibit lawmakers from
extending to the unborn the benefits of personhood in other
cases." 43 This part of the Roe holding has been strengthened by
the Court's opinion in Webster. legislators may now attribute the
qualities of legal personhood even to pre-viable fetuses.4 4 States
arguably have a compelling interest in promoting the welfare of
fetuses from the moment of conception and this interest may
support legislation such as that contemplated here. The state's
interest, however, must be balanced against women's constitutional
right to privacy.
45
The correction of constitutional defects through legislative
responses to the prosecution of pregnant drug users has not been
uniform across the nation. Prosecutors continue to employ existing
39 Id.
40 See id. at 27-28.
41 See id. at 28.
42 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
'1 Parness & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 258.
44 See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040,3057 (1989) (noting
that there was no reason "why the State's interest in protecting potential human life
should come into existence only at the point of viability, and that there should
therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting it
before viability").
45 See infra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
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statutes that facially protect children only after their birth.46 It is
unlikely that there will be much incentive for more specific
legislation in states where prosecutors have obtained convictions.
Successful prosecutors may find it unnecessary to support new
legislation.4 7 As long as prosecutors continue to apply existing
statutes in derogation of the basic principle of statutory construc-
tion that requires reliance on legislative intent, the due process
requirements of notice and fair warning will be violated.
2. Requirements of Notice and Fair Warning
The Keeler court provided a useful discussion of the notice and
fair warning concerns that are currently raised by prosecutors'
implicit inclusion of fetuses (or babies who suffered lasting injury
as fetuses) within the ambit of child abuse or drug trafficking
statutes. The court stated that "[t]he first essential of due process
is fair warning of the act which is made punishable as a crime."
48
This requirement of fair warning is rooted in the Constitution's
prohibition against legislative enactment of ex post facto laws.
49
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Bouie v. City of Colum-
bia,50 the Keeler court noted that "unforeseeable judicial enlarge-
ment" of existing statutes--a situation analogous to enactment of ex
post facto laws5 1-violates the due process requirement of fair
46 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 2, at 34 (noting that prosecutor Tony Tague
"ordered Kimberly Hardy arrested on the same charge prosecutors routinely use
against drug dealers: delivering drugs in the amount of less than 50 grams, a felony
in Michigan"); id. at 35 (noting that a prosecutor in North Carolina "charged an
addicted mother whose newborn had a positive toxicology test with... assault with
a deadly weapon").
47 Conversely, prosecutors who have failed to convict women who used drugs
during pregnancy may successfully urge state legislatures to pass "corrective"
legislation. See Logli, supra note 8, at 27.
48 Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 633, 470 P.2d 617, 626, 87 Cal. Rptr.
481, 490 (1970). The court further explained:
That the terms of a penal statute creatinga new offense must be sufficiently
explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to its penalties, is a well-recognized requirement,
consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of
law.
Id. (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
'9 See id. at 636, 470 P.2d at 626, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 490 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I,
§§ 9, 10).
so 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
51 It explained that
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warning, and concluded that the inclusion of fetuses within the state
murder statute constituted such an unforeseeable enlargement.
52
A comparable unforeseeable judicial enlargement of existing
laws is the use of drug delivery statutes in the current prosecutions
of addicted mothers. These statutes had typically been used against
drug dealers; their application to pregnant addicts was novel and
unanticipated. Recognizing the connection between novelty and
unforeseeability, the Keeler court rejected the prosecutor's interpre-
tation of the murder statute in part because of its novelty.53 While
innovative approaches to the drug problem were arguably forthcom-
ing in light of the much-discussed national "war on drugs,"
foreseeable action included the stricter but uncreative enforcement
of laws prohibiting drug delivery, possession, and sale, rather than
the novel applications of such laws. With regard to the current
prosecutions, it has been noted that "[t]hese drug [delivery] statutes
were not intended to apply to fetuses and prenatal behavior and it
was not considered a crime to take drugs during pregnancy when
these women did that. They could not have known they were
committing a crime.
" 54
The unforeseeability of a statute's application must be analyzed
from the defendant's perspective if the due process requirements of
"notice" and "fair warning" are to have any content.55 Potential
defendants must be warned or put on notice that their behavior may
when an "unforeseeable state-court construction of a criminal statute is
applied retroactively to subject a person to criminal liability for past
conduct, the effect is to deprive him of due process of law in the sense of
fair warning that his contemplated conduct constitutes a crime."...
"Indeed, an unforeseeablejudicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied
retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law [which] ... the
Constitution forbids."
Keeler, 2 Cal. 3d at 634, 470 P.2d at 626, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 490 (quoting Bouie, 378 U.S.
at 354-55).
52 See id. at 639, 470 P.2d at 630, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
53 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
54 Punishing Pregnant Addicts: Debate, Dismay, No Solution, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10,
1989, at E5, col. 5 [hereinafter Punishing Pregnant Addicts] (quoting Kary L. Moss, an
attorney with the ACLU Women's Rights Project, New York); see also Logli,supra note
8, at 24 (acknowledging that manslaughter and drug delivery statutes were not
intended to be used in prenatal injury cases). Because of the courts' duty to enforce
laws in consonance with legislative intent, it may be argued that an application of a
law in derogation of legislative intent is unforeseeable.
55 See, e.g., Keeler, 2 Cal. 3d at 635, 470 P.2d at 627, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 491
(accentuating the importance of evaluating due process rights from the defendant's
point of view by asking, "[W]ould the judicial enlargement of section 187 now
proposed have been foreseeable to this petitioner?").
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subject them to criminal liability. A critical method of notice is the
reporting of other cases within the jurisdiction. The Keeler court
based its decision in part on its finding "no reported decision of the
California courts which should have given petitioner notice that the
killing of an unborn but viable fetus was prohibited by [the state
murder statute]."56 Certainly, people do not consult local case
reporters before engaging in criminally questionable conduct;
ground-breaking cases, however, do generate a great deal of
publicity in the popular media. Arguably, pregnant Floridians who
use drugs afterJenniferJohnson's conviction are on notice that they
may be prosecuted.
57
At least one defendant, charged with gestational child abuse
after giving birth to two premature, cocaine-exposed babies, has
questioned the foreseeability of including a fetus within Florida's
child abuse statute. She stated: "I don't feel I'm a child abuser....
Being in my shoes, you wouldn't look at it like child abuse. I was
abusing myself, and something grew inside me."58 This argument
has been echoed by lawyers who decry the consequences of
according women and their fetuses separate, conflicting inter-
ests.
5 9
B. Fetal Rights v. Women's Rights
Since the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade,6 ° fetal
rights have been continuously expanded. 61 This trend is likely to
continue in the wake of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
62
56 Id. at 636, 470 P.2d at 628, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
57 On January 3, 1990, a Florida woman pleaded nolo contendre to charges of
delivering drugs to her fetus via her umbilical cord. See Woman Pleads No Contest in
Cocaine Birth, UPI,Jan. 4, 1990, BC Cycle, Regional News, Fla. (LEXIS, Nexis library,
UPST90 file).
58 Linn, supra note 12, at 34, col. 4.
59 One Boston lawyer has described the prosecution of women for conduct during
pregnancy as "preposterous .... It is conceptually splitting a woman in half by
saying that she is not only doing [something harmful] against herself but that she's
also [willfully] doing it against another." Sherman, supra note 1, at 28, col. 3 (quoting
Nancy Gertner of the law firm of Silvergate, Gertner, Fine & Good); see also infra
notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
60 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6 1 See Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights
to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 602-04 (1986) (discussing the
erosion of the requirement that a child be born alive in order to be considered an
alleged victim under wrongful death statutes and in criminal law generally).
2 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989); see also McNamara, supra note 5, at I (noting that
according to the ACLU, within three months of the Webster decision at least 10 cases
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which reserved to the states the right to limit abortions based on an
asserted state interest in potential life which may be found compel-
ling throughout pregnancy without regard for fetal viability.
63
Continued expansion of fetal rights engenders concern that
women's rights to privacy and self-determination may be compro-
mised. The prosecution of drug-addicted pregnant women raises
the additional problem of essentially punishing for "status."
1. Privacy Interests
The fundamental right to bear a child 64 is virtually unregulat-
ed by state law.65  A pregnant woman certainly may choose to
carry her baby to term regardless of fetal defects or ill effects on her
own health. It has been argued that states permissibly could impose
more regulations on birth in order to promote the interests of the
unborn.6 6 States may be unwilling to do so because of constitu-
tional precedent concerning the privacy of personal decisions
regarding procreation, marriage, and contraception. 67  Webster,
of fetal child abuse already had been filed across the country). See generally Bopp &
Coleson, What Does Webster Mean? 138 U. PA. L. RIEv. 157 (1989) (arguing that Roe
v. Wade is de facto overruled by Webster).
63 See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057.
' The fundamental right of all persons, married or single, to choose freely
whether or not to conceive or bear children was recognized by the Supreme Court
in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (stating that "[i]f the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child" (emphasis deleted and
footnotes omitted)).
65 For a discussion of states' general refusal to regulate births, see Parness &
Pritchard, supra note 36, at 286-93. Parness and Pritchard found that "[s]tate laws
compelling birth ... are rather scarce" despite the states' constitutional power to
"promote the interest of the unborn in attaining the full potential of life." Id. at 287.
Similarly, "while state laws prohibiting the birth of one already conceived might be
imaginable [and not necessarily unconstitutional] there seem to be no such laws." Id.
at 288-89. In sum, "most state laws affecting the birth of the unborn regulate only
the circumstances of birth and leave the ultimate decision regarding birth to the
pros pective parents." Id. at 292.
BSeeid. at286-88 (noting that "states retain considerable leeway in implementing
policies protecting the interests of the unborn" and suggesting, for example, that
states may proscribe post-viability abortion, compel the birth of pre-viable fetuses
carried by surrogate mothers, compel a woman to undergo a particular form of
childbirth, and compel the conception of a child by artificial insemination when the
mother is willingbut the father is not); see also Note, Rethinking[Mlotherhood: Feminist
Theoty and State Regulation of Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1325, 1326-33 (1990)
[hereinafter Rethinking [Miotherhood] (reviewing and analyzing states' efforts to
regulate maternal conduct during pregnancy, including judicial intervention in the
birthing process).
67 Cf Parness & Pritchard. subra note 36. at 286-87 (notine that. desnite such
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with its recognition of the state's interest in fetal welfare from the
moment of conception, 68 and its widening of the states' opportuni-
ty to prohibit abortions, may represent a move toward promoting
birth.69
To what extent does a woman's decision to carry a baby to term
affect her exercise of other fundamental rights, such as the right to
privacy? It has been argued that "[o]nce she decides to forgo
abortion and the state chooses to protect the fetus, the woman loses
the liberty to act in ways that would adversely affect the fetus."
70
Endorsement of this position could open the floodgates to prosecu-
tions of pregnant women for any activity that might conceivably
harm their fetuses, even if such activity could benefit the mother.
71
The state would effectively create an adversarial relationship
between mother and fetus which might threaten a woman's
fundamental rights by controlling her behavior during pregnan-
cy.
72
precedent, states may regulate birth in a variety of ways). The authors opine that
"[f]ar too often, states have failed to promote the interests of the unborn by the
means available to them." Id.
68 See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057 (noting that the "[s]tate has compelling interests
in ensuring maternal health and in protecting potential human life, and these
interests exist 'throughout pregnancy.'" (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O'ConnorJ, dissenting))).
69 Arguably, however, the interests of the state and the unborn would be better
served by encouraging the abortion of certain fetuses, such as those affected by
maternal drug use. See Parness & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 298 (suggesting that,
in some cases, "[lI]egal protection of the unborn can be achieved by ... promoting
the unborn's interest in not being born").
70 Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 437 (1983).
71 A woman could be held liable for injuring her fetus by taking action for her
own benefit no matter how compelling her need to take the potentially injurious
action. For example, a Michigan woman lost custody of her baby for more than one
year after the child was born with traces of Valium in its system. The mother had
taken the Valium prior to delivery in order to ease the pain caused by a car accident.
See Paltrow, supra note 6, at 43 (discussing In reJ.Jeffrey, No. 99851 (Mich. Ct. App.
filed Apr. 9, 1987)). Other behaviors that pose potential risks to fetuses, regardless
of maternal benefit, and that could result in a mother's liability include failing to eat
nutritious foods, using drugs (prescription, nonprescription, or illegal), smoking,
drinking alcoholic beverages, permitting exposure to infectious disease or to
workplace hazards, engaging in immoderate exercise or sexual activity, residing at
high altitudes for prolonged periods, or using a general anesthetic or labor-inducing
drugs. See Note, supra note 61, at 606-07; see also Paltrow, supra note 6, at 42 (noting
the fetal hazards posed by radiation exposure during airplane flights and the risk of
toxoplasmosis, a disease contracted through contact with cat feces).72 See Note, supra note 61, at 600. It has been further argued that "[b]y
substituting its judgment for that of the woman, the state deprives women of their
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Maternal behaviors that may cause fetal harm may be distin-
guished on a number of bases, such as the magnitude of the risk of
harm, the likely severity of the harm, the potential benefits to the
mother, and the likelihood that these benefits will be achieved. The
distinction most frequently noted, however-that between legal and
illegal maternal activity73 -bears no relation to fetal harm, the
danger ostensibly sought to be avoided by prosecuting pregnant
drug users.74 Further, it is axiomatic that illegal acts are illegal
regardless of the actor's reproductive status, so that pregnant
women who commit drug-related crimes are already subject to
prosecution regardless of their pregnancies. The legal-illegal
distinction is particularly problematic in the context of prosecuting
addicts.
2. A New Status Crime?
Drug addiction has been judicially designated a status, which
cannot be penalized as such. The Supreme Court in Robinson v.
California75 held unconstitutional a state law that criminalized the
condition of being a drug addict and accepted the validity of a
disease model of drug addiction.76  At least a portion of the
medical community currently regards substance abuse as a disorder
warranting medical intervention and treatment.77 Recent prosecu-
right to control their lives during pregnancy-a right to liberty and privacy protected
by the Constitution. Furthermore, by regulating women as if their lives were defined
solely by their reproductive capacity, the state perpetuates a system of sex discrimina-
tion that is based on the biological difference between the sexes, thus depriving
women of their constitutional right to the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 613;
see also Rethinking[Mlotlierhood, supra note 66, at 1333-42 (criticizing the rights-based
construction of mother and fetus as adversaries, particularly in the context of
maternal substance abuse, and emphasizing instead the intimate connection between
mothers and their fetuses).
73 See infra note 149.
74 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (describing legal maternal behaviors
that may harm fetuses); see also infra notes 146-53 and accompanying text (discussing
the overall failure to prosecute women whose prenatal smoking or drinking injures
their fetuses).
75 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
76The Court explained that narcotic addiction "is apparently an illness which may
be contracted innocently or involuntarily...- [and] that persons addicted to narcotics
'are diseased and proper subjects for [medical] treatment.'" Id. at 667 & n.8 (quoting
Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925)).
77 For example, the DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(rev. 3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R] published by the American Psychiatric
Association describes substance use disorders, including alcoholism and cocaine
abuse. See id. at 165-85.
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tions of women who were pregnant drug addicts have been
criticized for essentially punishing a status, or the coexistence of two
statuses that alone would be unpunishable and undeserving of
punishment. As determined by Robinson, the status of being a drug
addict cannot constitute a crime. Even drug use, a symptom of
addiction, is not ordinarily a crime.78 If drug addiction or drug
use is not a crime, "then what is being punished [by these prosecu-
tions] is the status of being pregnant"79 when it coexists with the
status of drug addiction or with drug use. The result of
criminalizing the coexistence of two unpunishable statuses-drug
addiction and pregnancy--is the creation of a new status crime.
8 0
The harm to others, such as the babies of drug addicts, which may
result from the convergence of addiction and pregnancy may be
addressed by independent statutes that focus on harm, not
status.8 1 Indeed, it is typically the case that when drug or alcohol
use results in harm to another person, the harmful "undesirable
behavior is ordinarily proscribed by another criminal statute... the
prosecution is limited to the crime ... independent of drug
use."8 2 If drug use alone is not a crime, but drug use by pregnant
women is, then pregnancy constitutes "a necessary element of a
remarkable new status-based criminal offense: [p]regnancy by a
drug-dependent person, or drug use by a pregnant woman.
"83
The recent expansion of fetal rights, as demonstrated by
prosecutions of pregnant drug addicts, may effectively deny the
fundamental right of reproduction to a particular class of sick
women (drug addicts) whose symptoms (compulsive drug use) may
injure their fetuses. This emphasis on fetal rights may lead to
further incursions on the rights of ill women to bear children.
There can be no justification for imposing criminal sanctions on
diseased persons simply because they are sick. The question
becomes whether the fact that a person is ill may be used as the
78 See Mariner, Glantz & Annas, Pregnancy, Drugs and the Perils of Prosecution, 9
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 30, 31 (1990).
79 Id.
80 See id.; Paltrow, supra note 6, at 41-42.8 1 See Mariner, Glantz & Annas, supra note 78, at 31; see also infra notes 95-99 and
accompanying text (discussing the legal infirmities of prosecuting pregnant addicts
in light of the need to show intent).
82 Mariner, Glantz & Annas, supra note 78, at 31.
83 1d; see also Paltrow, supra note 6, at 41-42 (stating that "none of the women have
been arrested for the crime of illegal drug use or possession. Instead, they are being
arrested for a new and independent crime: becoming pregnant while addicted to
drugs.").
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basis for regulating that person's behavior to the point of circum-
scribing rights that she would be accorded if she were healthy.
From the perspective of furtherinig fetal and childhood well-being,
it is clearly not in the best interests of children to be born of women
who are HIV-positive, cancer patients, or alcoholics. Alcoholic
women, women who are infected with HIV, and women who refuse
medical treatment for pregnancy-related ailments place their fetuses
at an increased risk of illness and physical and developmental
abnormalities. 84  Pregnant women who have cancer or epilepsy
often require drugs that may harm their fetuses.85 The constitu-
tional protections that preserve such persons' right to procreate
should extend to substance abusers as well. Adults have a right to
procreate, while children have no corollary right to be born healthy,
financially secure, or into a two-parent family.86 In each of these
cases the potential parent's right to reproduce predominates over
any imagined right of the fetus to be born to a healthy mother. The
prosecutions of drug-addicted mothers could foreseeably lead to
procreation being considered a privilege to be granted by the state
rather than a right rooted in the Constitution.
II. CRIMINAL THEORY
The current prosecutions of pregnant drug users demonstrate
a disregard for commonly accepted theories and objectives of the
criminal law. This Comment will examine two aspects of this
problem. First, the general prohibition against punishing persons
for their involuntary behavior will be considered in light of the
nature of drug addiction and the attendant potential for deterrence.
Second, Professor Kadish's criminogenesis analysis will be applied
to the current prosecutions. It will be argued that these prosecu-
tions create more harm than good.
84 See Nolan, Protecting Fetuses from Prenatal Hazards: Whose Crimes? What
Punishment? 9 CIUM. JUsT. ETHIcs 13, 15 (1990).
85 See Paltrow, supra note 6, at 42.
86 George J. Annas, professor of health law at Boston University School of
Medicine, comments: "There is no question women have the constitutional right to
become pregnant and give birth. Are we willing to sterilize everyone who has a
disease that can be passed to a fetus?" Punishing Pregnant Addicts, supra note 54, at
E5, col. 6.
Commenting on the wave of prosecutions of women who use illegal drugs during
pregnancy, social critic P.J. O'Rourke cynically noted, "If the legal reasoning behind
these cases is sound, then we should all go out and get our mothers arrested for
failing to marry rich guys with speedboats and big trust funds." O'Rourke, 1989-Slime
Time Live, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 14-28, 1989, at 36, 43.
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A. Punishing Involuntary Behavior
The Anglo-American criminal law tradition has consistently
recognized the immorality and futility of punishing individuals for
involuntary behavior. Culpability generally requires a voluntary act;
people do not deserve punishment for acts they neither intended
nor controlled. The Model Penal Code (MPC), for example,
imposes no criminal liability in the absence of a voluntary act or
omission.8 7 The voluntary act requirement exists, among other
reasons, to foster deterrence, a primary goal of the criminal law.
8 8
Distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary acts has proved
difficult, and behavior associated with drug addiction presents
unique problems of classification. This section will describe
involuntary aspects of drug addiction and analyze the problems
associated with punishing addicts for the consequences of their
involuntary acts.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that drug addiction is
an illness, stating that addicts "are diseased and proper subjects for
[medical] treatment."8 9 The disease model of addiction is widely
accepted by the medical community,90 and the American Psychiat-
ric Association categorizes substance-use disorders as mental disor-
ders.9 1  These disorders, including the cocaine dependence
plaguing many mother-defendants, are addictions, identified in part
by the diagnostic criterion of "continued use despite knowledge of
having a persistent or recurrent ... problem that is caused or
exacerbated by the use -of the ... substance." 92  This loss of
control over drug intake may be particularly pronounced in crack
users. "The drug's hold is so vicious, so absolute, that it overrides
even the most basic of human drives.... [This] is why a woman can
keep getting high while she's pregnant, or interrupt the delivery of
87 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (1962) ("A person is not guilty of an offense
unless his liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the omission
to perform an act of which he is physically capable."). Drug-taking is an act, not an
omission; the discussion in this Comment will be restricted, therefore, to voluntary
and involuntary acts, rather than to omissions.
88 See id. § 2.01 comment 1 ("[T]he law cannot hope to deter involuntary
movement or to stimulate action that cannot physically be performed ...
89 Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925).
90 See, e.g., Smith, Substance Use Disorders: Drugs &'Alcoho in REvIEW OF GENERAL
PSYCHIATRY 278, 279 (H. Goldman ed. 1984) (describing the World Health
Organization's definition of addiction).
9' See DSM-III-R, supra note '77, at 165-85.
92 Id. at 169.
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twins to call her dealer, or forget that she delivered a baby altogeth-
er."93 Such addictive behavior may be considered compulsive or
irresistible. Women who want to take proper care of their children,
during pregnancy and after, find themselves unable to do so
because of the overpowering effect of drugs.
94
Punishing involuntary, addictive behavior is unlikely to deter
that behavior, because the actor is unable to control her behavior.
Nonetheless, courts have been unwilling to excuse liability for acts
resulting from irresistible impulses.95 Punishment is often justi-
fied on the basis of protecting third parties from harm caused by
substance abusers' uncontrollable acts.
96
The risk-to-others analysis is unsatisfactory in the pregnancy
context because it is unlikely that pregnant addicts are culpable
within the accepted terms of criminal law.97 A woman who does
" Linn, supra note 12, at 26.
94 Charles Hux, director of maternal/fetal medicine at Hahnemann University
Hospital in Philadelphia has stated:
[T]he monster in all this is cocaine .... A lot of women ... would like to
be good human beings and would like to live the right lifestyle. But the
cocaine makes a monster out of them .... You have to hate the drug and
not hate the mom. You have to look at what the drug does to human
beings.
Id.
95 The definition of an involuntary act has been explained as follows:
[I]n the criminal law an act is not to be regarded as an involuntary act
simply because the doer does not remember it.... Nor is an act to be
regarded as an involuntary act simply because the doer could not control his
impulse to do it.... Nor is an act to be regarded as an involuntary act
simply because it is unintentional or its consequences are unforeseen.
S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, supra note 23, at 253; see also Powell v.
Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 521 (1968) (refusing to recognize chronic alcoholism as a
defense to a charge of appearing drunk in public despite the prevailing medical view
that "a chronic alcoholic does not appear in public by his own volition but under a
compulsion symptomatic of the disease of chronic alcoholism").
96 Seesupra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. Jeff Deen, the Florida prosecutor
who initiated proceedings against Jennifer Johnson, stated that one policy goal of
such prosecutions is "to interrupt the cycle, so we don't end up with another cocaine
baby." Linn, supra note 12, at 25. In addition, it is hoped that punishment may
prevent convicted addicts from repeating injurious behavior by incapacitating them
through imprisonment. It is important to note, however, that even the incarceration
of pregnant drug users cannot guarantee that they do not use drugs, as noted by Dr.
Brian Udell of Broward General Medical Center, who "had two patients who were
smoking coke in jail on the day of their delivery." Id. at 26; see also Nolan, supra note
84, at 19 (stating that "[d]rug use can continue despite imprisonment, and medical
attention for pregnant women in prisons may be sorely inadequate").97 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (1962) (describing the culpability requirement
that the defendant must have acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently).
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not know that she is pregnant clearly must be unaware that her drug
use is injuring anyone but herself. This case is clearly distinguish-
able from that of the drunk driver who knows or should know that
other cars have access to the road, or the crack addict who forms
and carries out the intent to rob while under the influence of drugs.
Moreover, an addict who knows she is pregnant may be unaware of
the drug's effects on her fetus. When a pregnant addict takes
drugs, she often will not view the fetus as a victim, and she probably
intends no harm to the baby at all.98 It may be difficult even to
prove that drug-taking during pregnancy is reckless. To have
successfully convicted Melanie Green of involuntary manslaughter,
prosecutor Logli would have to have proved that she acted reckless-
ly in taking drugs when pregnant-that she took a risk that a
reasonable person would not have taken. The grand jury deter-
mined that Logli had not proved this mens rea requirement of the
offense.
99
Conceptually, pregnant addicts may be likened to the "tempo-
rarily insane" who successfully defend against criminal charges on
the grounds of lack of culpability. It must be noted, however, that
defendants who have committed criminal acts under the influence
of drugs have been unsuccessful in arguing that drugs produced
temporary insanity that should excuse their behavior. 0 0 This
defense is typically rejected on the ground that the drugs were taken
voluntarily with knowledge of the likely effects on behavior.' 0 ' It
is, however, possible that this argument may be applied with greater
success in the context of the prosecutions at issue here.
Although the pathogenesis of crack addiction may consist of
initial voluntary drug use, falling within the MPC's definition of self-
98 See supra notes 58-59 & 93-94 and accompanying text. James Bopp, general
counsel to the National Right to Life Committee, believes that prosecutions of
pregnant drug users are flawed because it is nearly impossible to prove that the
women intended to injure their babies. He stated that such prosecutions "are rarely
justified because it must be proven that a woman knowingly intended to pose
substantial risk of harm to the unborn child. It's unlikely a woman takes drugs to
harm her child. Cocaine addiction is compulsive behavior." Punishing Pregnant
Addicts, supra note 54, at E5, col. 6.
99 See Reardon, Drugs and Pregnancy Debate Far From Resolved, Chicago Tribune,
May 28, 1989, at 5, col. 1. See generally Mariner, Glantz & Annas, supra note 78, at
35-36 (discussing criminal intent in the context of drug use by pregnant women).
10o See, e.g., State v. Hall, 214 N.W.2d 205 (Iowa 1974) (rejecting defense of
temporary drug-induced insanity by defendant who committed murder under the
influence of LSD).
101 See id. at 208; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5) (1962) (defining self-
induced intoxication, which is not a defense).
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induced intoxication, 10 2 this stage is often followed by involuntary
drug use. I0 3 Once a person is addicted, she may be considered
to have a "mental disease" within the terms of the MPC.I0 4 If a
woman becomes pregnant after she is addicted and when her drug
use has become involuntary, it can be argued that drug-induced
temporary insanity prevented her from recognizing or considering
the likely ill effects of the drug on her fetus. Indeed, addicts'
descriptions of the effects of crack can be deemed consistent with
temporary insanity.I0 5 Even when a pregnant addict knows that
crack is injurious to her fetus, the insanity-like effects of the drug
may render her unable to act in accordance with this knowl-
edge.
10 6
B. Criminogenesis
In the late 1960s, some lawyers attempted to limit the scope of
the criminal law by analyzing the effects of laws on the overall
functioning of the criminal justice system. 0 7  According to
Professor Kadish, the enforcement of certain laws has a criminogen-
ic effect: enforcement breeds more harm than ignoring the
offenses. Kadish concluded that three classes of offenses should be
abolished because of their criminogenic effects. These categories
are morals offenses, offenses that serve to permit police or
prosecutorial intervention into what is more properly the realm of
social service agencies, and offenses that manufacture police
authority to apprehend suspected criminals with slight cause.
10 8
Although these offenses have been characterized as "private" or
102 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5) (1962).
103 See DSM-III-R, supra note 77, at 165 (noting that involuntary drug use-thc
inability to cut down or discontinue use-is one indication ofa pattern of pathological
use that is distinguishable from nonpathological psychoactive substance use).
104 Under the Model Penal Code, intoxication alone is not evidence of a mental
disease. See MODEL PENAL CODf § 2.08(3) (1962). A bona fide mental disease,
however, may constitute a defense to criminal charges. See id. § 4.01(1) ("A person
is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law.").
105 Cf Linn, supra note 12, at 26 (stating that crack cocaine's strong hold on the
addict undermines the maternal instinct).
106 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
107 See Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS 157 (1967); Kadish,
More on Overcrirninalization: A Reply to ProfessorJunker, 19 UCLA L. REv. 719, 719-20
(1972) [hereinafter Kadish, More on Overcriminalization].
108 See Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, supra note 107, at 157, 159.
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"victimless" crimes, 109 terms inapplicable to drug-abuse by pregnant
women whose babies are considered victims, the prosecution of
these women may be viewed as an attempt by the criminal justice
system to provide services such as drug counseling or medical care
in the face of default by social service agencies.
10
Kadish's analytical framework is well suited to these prosecu-
tions. He considers "how the inevitable process of actual enforce-
ment of ... laws (a) so poorly serves the objectives [of enforce-
ment], and (b) in any event produces a variety of substantial costs,
including adverse consequences for the effective enforcement of the
criminal law generally.""' This two-step analysis requires a
determination of the legal. objectives in question and a weighing of
the costs and benefits of enforcement. The objectives of prosecut-
ing women who deliver drug-exposed babies have been identified as
deterring prosecuted women from having more drug-exposed
children,"12 and providing drug counseling or other care.
1 1 3
Kadish identifies four types of enforcement costs that may outweigh
the benefits of enforcing laws that poorly serve their asserted
objectives: (1) diminished respect for law; (2) unenforceability,
corruption, and discrimination; (3) the crime tariff; and (4)
misallocation of enforcement resources.
14
'0 9Junker, C0minalization and 0riminogenesis, 19 UCLA L. REv. 697, 698 (1972).
110 ProsecutorJeff Deen argues that the purpose of these prosecutions is to get
drug-addicted mothers into treatment programs, not to punish them. See Linn, supra
note 12, at 25, 34. Jennifer Johnson, who was prosecuted by Deen, is serving a
sentence that includes mandatory drug treatment. See id. at 34. Unfortunatcly,
pregnant drug addicts may find that conviction is their only certain path to drug
treatment. Many poor, pregnant women are unable to get drug treatment without
judicial intervention because they are routinely excluded from treatment programs.
For example, a survey of 78 drug treatment programs in New York City found that
54% excluded pregnant women, 67% excluded pregnant Medicaid recipients, and 87%
excluded pregnant crack addicts on Medicaid. See Sherman, supra note 1, at 29, col.
2. Melanie Green sought drug Ireatment but was confronted by six-month waiting
lists. See McNamara, supra note 5, at 11, col. 3. Such waiting periods are particularly
problematic for pregnant women, who may be unable to enter treatment until after
considerable harm has been done to their fetuses. See also One Drug-Using Mothers
Stoty, 11 YouTH L. NEws 19 (1990) (describing a pregnant heroin addict's attempts
to obtain treatment, her loss of child custody, and her possible prosecution).
11 Kadish, More on Overcriininalization, supra note 107, at 720.
112 See Linn, supra note 12, at 25.
11 Seesupra note 110; see also PunishingPregnant Addicts, supra note 54, at E5, cols.
2-3 ("The nice thing about jail is. that moms get good prenatal care, good nutrition
and they're clean." (quoting Dr. Jan Bays, Director of Child Abuse Programs,
Emanuel Hospital, Portland, Or.)). But see supra note 96 (noting the possible
availability of drugs and the inadequacies of prenatal care in prisons).
114 See Junker, supra note 109, at 700; Kadish, The Crisis of Overcmiininalization,
PROSECUTION OF MOTHERS
This section will argue that these prosecutions do not fulfill
their objectives, and that the costs of enforcing sanctions against
drug-using mothers outweigh the benefits. Costs incurred in
categories (1), (2) and (4) will be discussed. Category (3) is
inapplicable because it is identified as a special cost of using the
criminal law "to prohibit commercial transactions in goods and
services."
115
1. Objectives of the Prosecutions
The asserted and implicit objectives of the prosecutions have
been discussed above. Briefly, prosecutors hope to deter pregnant
women from taking drugs and drug addicts from having children.
While general deterrence may be unachievable because of the
involuntary nature of drug use by addicts, incapacitation and
specific deterrence are hailed as viable goals to be attained by the
incarceration or monitoring of pregnant addicts. Prosecuted
addicts may be sentenced to attend rehabilitation programs to which
they may have been denied admission previously.
It is too early to tell what the long-term effects of these
prosecutions will be on the mothers and children involved. For
children born of drug addicts, the intervention wrought by
prosecuting their mothers may prove futile. The children will suffer
the long-term effects of their mothers' drug use regardless of
medical, legal, or social intervention.116 If the mothers prove
unable to care for their children adequately, the legal system may
resort to proceedings to determine maternal fitness regardless of
drug-addiction status. The alleged benefits of the prosecutions
discussed in this Comment may accrue to the as-yet unconceived
babies of addicts and former addicts.
Florida prosecutorJeff Deen asserted that the goal of prosecut-
ing women who deliver drug-exposed babies is to deter them from
supra note 107, at 160, 163-64.
15 Junker, supra note 109, at 707. Crime tariff costs may militate in favor of
decriminalizing narcotics. See Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, supra note 107,
at 163-65; see also infra note 149 (discussing renewed debate concerning drug
legalization). The illegality of substances used by pregnant women is not at issue
here, however. See infra text accompanying notes. 148-52. The other elements of the
cost-benefit analysis (1, 2, 4) apply to the prosecutions in question here as well as to
the potential extension of prosecutions to pregnant users of alcohol and tobacco.
116See Lockwood, What's Known-And What's Not Known-AboutDrug.Exposed Infants,
11 YOUTH L. NEWS 15 (1990); Morrow, Early Intervention Programs May Help Drug-
Exposed Children, 11 YOUTH L. NEWS 31 (1990).
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having more afflicted chil.dren. 117 The attainment of this goal,
however, turns on the deterrent function of these prosecutions.
The nature of addiction makes it unlikely that these prosecutions
will have much deterrent value. 118 In addition, the goal of insur-
ing fetal health may better be served by providing pregnant addicts
with drug treatment and prenatal care. It may be that the only goal
served by these prosecutions is punishment, an objective denied by
prosecutors. 119 Thus, under the first prong of Kadish's analysis,
the enforcement of sanctions against women who deliver drug-
exposed babies poorly serves the objectives of enforcement.
2. Loss of Respect
Whether these prosecutions engender a loss or gain of respect
for the criminal justice system depends upon the sociopolitical views
of the speaker. Some see the prosecutions as creative approaches
to a seemingly insoluble problem. 120 Prosecutors may be viewed
as "making a difference," reducing the drug problem to individual
terms, and vindicating the rights of innocent child-victims. Others,
however, feel that prosecutors have misused their power and
authority, terrorizing poor women who lead desperate lives rather
than prosecuting those who make drugs available in the first
place. 121 The failure of the Winnebago County grand jury to
117 See Linn, supra note 12, at 25.
118 See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
119 See Mariner, Glantz & Annas, supra note 78, at 37.
120 For example, Dr. Jan Bays, Director of child abuse programs at Emanuel
Hospital in Portland, Oregon, has stated:
We must up the ante to criminalize or impose reproductive controls on
people who are out of control.... I'm fed up with seeing damaged babies
born who have lost the right to make what they can out of life .... I don't
see that the courts have had any impact.
We thought we were getting tough when we tried voluntary contracts
that required the parents to go into drug treatment, gave the state legal
custody or allowed it to monitor the child. But it doesn't work .... We
can't say forever that people have unlimited rights to have a child.
Punishing Pregnant Addicts, supra note 54, at ES, col. 2-3.
Plymouth County, Massachusetts Prosecutor William C. O'Malley has said, "I'd
much rather see this problem dealt with by the more subtle systems of public health,
social services and education. But, damn it, we've had nothing but failures .... It's
time to invoke the mechanism of last resort." Id. at E5, col. 4.
121 Neonatologist Dr. Loretta Finnegan, founder of a program for pregnant
addicts in Philadelphia, notes that most of the women she treats have been the victims
of childhood sexual or physical abuse, rape as adolescents, and domestic violence at
the hands of husbands or boyfriends as adults. See Linn, supra note 12, at 25; see also
Paltrow, supra note 6, at 42 (noting that several recently prosecuted women have been
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indict Melanie Green has been construed as a victory of compassion
and common sense over prosecutorial gamesmanship.1 22 At the
very least, these prosecutions send a message about the new
willingness of government to interfere in the most intimate aspects
of women's lives. It may be increasingly difficult to maintain
respect for a system that prosecutes drug-addicted mothers,
arguably the victims of profit-seeking drug dealers, while the dealers
are perceived as "going free."
3. Unenforceability
The enforcement of criminal sanctions against women who
deliver drug-exposed babies raises serious concerns about the
proper role of the medical profession in identifying defendants.
Currently, some states require medical professionals to report the
drug-dependence of newborns or the presence of drugs in their
systems.
123
Many medical professionals are uncomfortable about being
forced to set these prosecutions in motion.1 24 Some health care
providers believe that potential liability will discourage pregnant
drug addicts from seeking prenatal care. 125 "Health care provid-
ers fear that they will lose the struggle to bring pregnant women
into prenatal care and that mothers will not deliver their babies in
hospitals. They foresee more abandoned babies, more seriously
disabled babies, more infant deaths."126  Some women whose
battered); id. at 45 (noting that many drug-addicted women were victims of rape or
incest).
GeorgeJ. Annas argues that "[t]o prosecute people who make money off drugs
can be useful. But to drag in pregnant women is not, because they have real
problems tin addition to] drugs. Usually it's poverty, discrimination, living where
services aren't available." Punishing Pregnant Addicts, supra note 54, at E5, col. 6.
12 2 See Colen, ReininginRunaway Prosecutors, Newsday,June 6,1989, at 13 (Nassau
& Suffolk ed.).
123 See e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1352 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 415.503(9)(a)(2), 415.504 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 350-
1.1(a), 587-2 (1985 & Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2053, 2054 (Smith-
Hurd 1988 & Supp. 1990); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 119 § 51A (Law. Co-op. 1990); N.Y.
SOC. SERV. LAw § 412(9) (McKinney Supp. 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846A
(West Supp. 1989).
124 See Pinkney, Drugs in Pregnancy: A Growing Crisis With no Easy Solution, Am.
Med. News, Oct. 6, 1989, at 30, col. 4 (discussing pressures on the medical
community to identify women who use drugs during their pregnancies).
125 See id. at 1, col. 4 (noting a warning that a "punitive atmosphere against
cocaine users threatens to drive women out of the health care system and to taint
efforts to deal with addiction as a medical problem"); Linn, supra note 12, at 24.
126 Larsen, Creating Common Goals for Medica Legal and Child Protection
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babies test positive for drugs may be enrolled in substance abuse
programs or may voluntarily seek treatment with the help of
supportive families; 127 medical professionals may deem criminal
intervention in such cases to be inappropriate. 128 Prenatal drug
treatment is very difficult: to obtain 129 and many medical profes-
sionals believe that rather than being penalized, women who are
successful in locating such care should be rewarded and encouraged
to take care of themselves and their babies. These considerations
may make health care providers resist compliance with reporting
requirements, and such resistance could render criminal sanctions
unenforceable.
Attempts to evade reporting requirements may also have
criminogenic effects. AS Kadish states, the creation of a new
category of crime is likely to breed an increase in other related
crimes. 30 For example, medical personnel may refuse to reveal
their drug findings in an effort not to lose their patients, or
potential defendants may attempt to bribe hospital staff to suppress
their reports.' 3 1 Furthermore, demand for abortions may also in-
crease, l3 2 and if states continue to limit the legal availability of
abortions, this increased demand will be for illegal procedures.
4. Corruption and Discrimination
Corrupt or discriminatory enforcement of sanctions lessens
respect for the law and may generate more crime. For example,
women who are likely to be prosecuted may bribe officials, while
those unlikely to face charges engage in criminal behavior unde-
Communities, in A.B.A CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, DRUG EXPOSED INFANTS
AND THEIR FAMILIES: COORDINATING RESPONSES OF THE LEGAL, MEDICAL AND CHILD
PROTECTION SYSTEM 3, 6 (1990).
127 See id.
128 See id.
129 See Chavkin, supra note 14, at A21, col. 2 (discussing surveys of the availability
of prenatal programs for pregnant addicts); see also Sherman, supra note 1, at 29, col.
1-2; supra note 110 and accompanying text.130 See Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, supra note 107, at 164 (finding that
the criminalization of gambling and selling narcotics has spawned organizations that
engage in "satellite forms of c.rime" such as bribery, loan-sharking, and labor
racketeering).
131 Dishonesty on the part of a potential defendant has already been noted. Lynn
Bremer has acknowledged that she brought another person's drug-free urine sample
to her doctor for testing, claiming that the sample was her own. See Hoffman, supra
note 2, at 55, col. 2.
132 See Paltrow, supra note 6, at 42.
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terred. Discriminatory enforcement of the reporting require-
ment-the preliminary stage in the prosecution of pregnant drug
users-has already been reported in Pinellas County, Florida.
33
A study found that black mothers were 9.58 times more likely to be
reported for their substance abuse even though white women were
1.09 times more likely to have abused a substance just prior to their
first prenatal care visit.13 4  This pattern is consistent with the
notion that the real motivating factor behind these prosecutions is
drug hysteria, aimed specifically at poor, minority addicts who are
often viewed as causes of the drug problem rather than its vic-
tims. 135 More than half of the women who have been prosecuted
thus far are women of color.136 As crack spreads beyond the
inner city and gains a hold in suburbia,137 there will be more
middle- and upper-class white addicts. It remains to be seen
whether they will face prosecution as frequently as their poorer
black and white counterparts.1
38
The prosecutions at issue poorly serve the goals asserted by
prosecutors. In addition, substantial harms to the criminal justice
system are introduced: people may lose respect for the system, lack
of compliance by medical personnel may render the foundation
reporting statutes unenforceable, and corruption and discrimination
may ensue as women and their health care providers seek to avoid
criminal intervention and as the judicial system disproportionately
sanctionj poor, minority women. Thus, under Kadish's analysis, this
prosecu,-rial approach should be abandoned in favor of interven-
tion by medical and social service agencies.
133 See Sherman, supra note 1, at 28-29, col. 4.
134 See id.
135 It has been noted that "'[o]ur society has a history of discrimination against
women, blacks and poor people. The majority of those being denied drug treatment
and then being arrested in these cases are all three.'" McNamara, supra note 5, at 11,
col. 3 (quoting ACLU attorney Lynn Paltrow); see also Linn, supra note 12, at 24;
Paltrow, supra note 6, at 42.
136 See Paltrow, supra note 6, at 42.
13
7 See Malcolm, Crack, Bane of Inner City, is now Gripping Suburbs, N.Y. Times, Oct.
1, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 1 (reporting substantial increases of crack addiction among
white upper-income and middle-income Americans).
,38 One prosecution has been brought against a white, middle-class cocaine addict.
See Hoffman, supra note 2, at 35, col. 2 (discussing the prosecution in Michigan of
attorney Lynn Bremer).
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III. PROTECTING LIFE OR COMBATTING DRUG ABUSE?
Prosecutions of women who deliver drug-exposed babies may
also be seen as an expression of national concern about two major
social issues: abortion139 and drug abuse. 140  It appears to be
more than coincidence that the rash of these prosecutions during
the summer of 1989 followed the Webster decision and accompanied
a heightened public focus on abortion and the "war on drugs." At
first glance, these prosecutions appear perfectly consistent with
"right to life" policies and objectives, such as the promotion of birth
and the acknowledgement of fetal rights. Further analysis, however,
reveals that such prosecutions actually may lead to consequences
that ardent supporters of fetal rights would not condone. Pregnant
drug addicts may be less likely to seek medical care that could
benefit their unborn children and themselves, or they may seek
abortions.
Many health care providers have expressed concern about the
chilling effect that these prosecutions are likely to have on pregnant
drug addicts' seeking medical attention. 14 1 They believe that
139 See McNamara, supra note 5, at 1, col. 2-3 ("It is foolish to think these suits
aren't related to the abortion issue .... They spring from the same concern that
drives the antiabortion position--that is to say, assigning a more elevated moral and
legal status to the fetus, granting it personhood separate from the woman carrying
it." (quotingArthur Caplan, professor of ethics, University of Minnesota)); Punishing
Pregnant Addicts, supra note 54, at ES, col. 6 ("This is a surrogate for the big debate
on abortion. Although pro-choicers are sympathetic to prenatal issues, they are
terrified to give in at all on fetal rights for fear of providing grist to anti-abortionists."
(quoting Alan Dershowitz)).
140 See Hoffman, supra note 2, at 57 (stating that "[t]his crusade is not about
getting women into treatment or protecting babies... [but] about winning the war
on drugs." (quotingAlan Rapoport, one of Kimberly Hardy's attorneys)); Logli, supra
note 8, at 23.
141 See Linn, supra note 12, at 24; Pinkney, supra note 124, at 1, col. 4. But see
supra note 120 (concerning a doctor's advocacy of the use of criminal sanctions
against mothers who bear drug-affected babies).
Attorneys and defendants have also expressed concern about the consequences
of candid discussion with health care professionals-consequences that, if foreseen by
other pregnant addicts, may deter them from seeking prenatal care.
Jennifer Johnson's attorney has noted the legal significance of his client's
discussion of her addiction with medical personnel:
The interview [with the hospital's social worker] became the backbone of
the prosecution's case .... [A]fter a while, she was also interviewed by a
police investigator.., and she talked with him and he discussed if she used
cocaine while she was pregnant. She said yes. She didn't anticipate that this
was going to lead to an arrest. She thought this is what she had to do to get
the child back.
Linn, supra note 12, at 25.
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incentives should be structured to encourage these women to seek
prenatal care, which may include drug counseling, rather than avoid
it because of fear of prosecution. Supporters of fetal rights, who
envision a fetal right to a drug-free, healthy gestation, 142 must
recognize that this goal can be accomplished more fully by encour-
aging drug addicts to seek medical care than by threatening them
with criminal sanctions.1 43 The women who have been prosecut-
ed to date had already delivered drug-exposed babies when they
were charged with criminal offenses. It is obvious that both these
women and their babies would have enjoyed a healthier pregnancy
had their drug abuse been detected and treated as early as possible.
Their prosecutions send a message to others in their position that
an attempt to find proper medical care during pregnancy will lead
to criminal court.
It also is likely that some pregnant addicts will choose to abort
rather than run the risk of delivering a baby whose birth will be the
subject of criminal investigation and sanctions. 144 Surely this is
not the outcome sought by right-to-life supporters of such prosecu-
tions. If abortion restrictions are enacted and enforced as states
respond to Webster, the pregnant addict may find herself choosing
between an illegal abortion and an "illegal" delivery. Both mother
Lynn Bremer, who discussed her cocaine addiction with her obstetrician during
prenatal office visits, describes herself as "a perfect example of someone who tried
to reach out, and it's all coming back in my face .... I feel betrayed .... Everyone
I talked to about my drug problem has been subpoenaed." Hoffman, supra note 2,
at 55, col. 1.
142 Such a right has been found by at least one state court. See In re Baby X, 97
Mich. App. 111, 115, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (1980) (stating that "a child has a legal
right to begin life with a sound mind and body" (citing Womack v. Buchhorn, 384
Mich. 718, 725, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (1971))).
143 Criminal sanctions are not likely to deter involuntary addictive behavior, but
they may deter the voluntary behavior of seeking medical care. On the deterrent
effect of threatened criminal sanctions on women seeking prenatal care, see Mariner,
Glantz & Annas, supra note 78, at 37 (stating that "[t]here is reason to believe that
women will avoid prenatal delivery care if detection of their drug use could lead to
their arrest or loss of child custody"); Paltrow, supra note 6, at 44-45 (noting that
"prosecutions and convictions deter pregnant women from getting what little health
care is available ... [and further that] women who do seek care are often too
frightened to speak openly to their doctors about their problems"). But see Hoffman,
supra note 2, at 57, col. 4 (noting comments of Muskegon General Hospital staff
psychologist Cheryl Gawkowski that some pregnant addicts have sought drug
treatment because of their fear of incarceration, while others have avoided prenatal
care because of this same fear).
144 See Paltrow, supra note 6, at 42.
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and child are likely to suffer either way, as the mother faces
prosecution and the child loses any chance for a healthy life.
It is no exaggeration to state that the nation is deeply concerned
about drug abuse. News reports and incidents of daily urban life
barrage us with the horrors of addiction. 145 Drug-addicted babies
are the smallest victims in a social system characterized by violence
and desperation. The babies of drug addicts are not, however, the
only ones who may suffer the ill consequences of maternal behavior
during pregnancy: the deleterious effects of alcohol14 6 and
tobacco 147 on fetuses have also been well documented. Widespread
and insidious as illegal drug use is, liquor and cigarettes are even
more accessible and widely used. If the primary objective of
prosecuting women who deliver drug-exposed babies is to foster
145 For interesting descriptions of the American drug subculture, see Bourgois,
Just Another Night on Crack Stree N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1989, § 6 (Magazine), at 53;
O'Rourke, Taking Drugs-Seiiousv, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 30, 1989, at 57 (1989).
146 Fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) is the name given to the set of abnormalities
resulting from maternal alcohol use during pregnancy. The syndrome is character-
ized by the presence of one or more of the following developmental defects:
(1) low birth weight and small size with failure to catch up in size or weight;
(2) mental retardation, with an average IQ in the 60s; and (3) a variety of
birth defects, with a large percentage of cardiac abnormalities. The fetuses
are very quiet in utero, and there is an increased frequency of breech
presentations [which may lead to delivery complications]. There is a higher
incidence of delayed postnatal growth and behavior development. The risk
factors are appreciably higher when more than 6 drinks are ingested each
day.
CURRENT MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS & TREATMENT 662 (M. Krupp, S. Schroeder & L.
Tierney eds. 1987). Infants who exhibit FAS suffer from irreversible, long-term
sequelae such as growth deficiencies and are likely to have difficulty in school. See,
e.g., CURRENT PEDIATRIC DIAGNOSIS & TREATMENT 92 (C. Kempe, H. Silver, D.
O'Brien & V. Fulginiti 9th ed. 1987) (noting that the severity of outcome is not
influenced by socioeconomic or educational factors). For a description of a family's
attempts to deal with an adopted son's FAS complications, see M. DORRIS, THE
BROKEN CORD (1989).
147 The fetal effects of maternal cigarette smoking can be the same as the effects
of maternal drinking. See CURRENT MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS & TREATMENT, supra note
146, at 662.
Maternal smoking has been conclusively associated with decreased birth
weight at every gestational age after 30 weeks .... [I]nvestigators have
found that light smoking as well as heavy smoking ... is associated with
increased perinatal death. . .. Preliminary results of follow-up for 5 years
have shown an increase in postneonatal deaths, hospital admissions, physical
and mental impairments, and respiratory and skin diseases in children of
smoking compared to nonsmoking mothers.
CURRENT PEDIATRIC DIAGNOSIS & TREATMENT, supra note 146, at 92-93.
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fetal well-being, prosecutions of women who smoke cigarettes or
drink while pregnant is a logicl extension.
1 48
Why have women who smoke and drink while pregnant largely
avoided the prosecutions leveled at their drug-addicted counter-
parts? The answer may be found in society's unwillingness to
tolerate drugs and drug users, in contrast with its general accep-
tance of alcohol and tobacco. Drugs are illegal while liquor and
cigarettes are not.1 49 The legality distinction fails in the context
148 This extension is feared by civil libertarians and others concerned with
women's rights. "Will women next be arrested if they smoke ... ? Where do we
draw the line and who will do the monitoring?" asks a staff attorney at the ACLU
Women's Rights Project. Punishing Pregnant Addicts, supra note 54, at E5, col. 5. It
should be noted that since 1984 cigarette packages may display the warning:
"Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result In Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low
Birth Weight." 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (1988). Pregnant women who smoke can no
longer defend their actions by stating that they didn't know that smoking was bad for
their babies.
The Oregon legislature failed to enact a statute criminalizing alcohol c6nsump-
tion by pregnant women. See Development in the Law, supra note 34, at 224 & n.5.
A public defender in Melanie Green's hometown ofRockford, Illinois, found that the
local hospital had referred no FAS cases to the court system. See Linn, supra note 12,
at 24.
InJanuary 1990, a resident of Laramie County, Wyo. who drank while pregnant
was charged with child abuse. The woman, four to five months pregnant when
charged, had previously borne a child who suffered from FAS. See Pregnant Woman
in WyomingFaces ChildAbuse ChargesforDrinking, Phila. Inquirer,Jan. 22,1990, at A2,
col. 3. Charges were dropped because the prosecution was unable to prove that the
fetus had been injured as a result of the mother's alleged drinking. See Child-Abuse
Case Dismissed in Wyoming, Wash. Times, Feb. 2, 1990, at A7. The woman's baby
appeared to be healthy when he was born in June. See Woman Once Charged With
Abuse of Fetus Gives Birth, UPI,June 18, 1990, BC cycle, Regional News, Colo. (LEXIS,
Nexis library, UPST9O file).
Recent federal legislation mandates that on and after the end of the twelve-
month period following November 18, 1988, all alcoholic beverages sold or
distributed in the United States must bear the warning that "According to the
Surgeon General, women should not drink alcoholic beverages during pregnancy
because of the risk of birth defects." 27 U.S.C. § 215(a) (1988).
' Plymouth County Prosecutor William C. O'Malley relies on the illegality of
drugs to distinguish the current wave of prosecutions from any possible extension
into prosecutions of women who use legal substances. See PunishingPregnant Addicts,
supra note 54, at E5, cols. 3-4. "1 can't foresee the prosecution of a case where the
underlying facts are not illegal. I don't see myself as a pregnancy cop. I don't think
that's the role of the DA." Wong, DA Calls for Guidelines in Fetal Injury Cases, Boston
Globe, Nov. 4, 1989, at 25, col. 2. O'Malley has also characterized these prosecutions
as "protection of a child from physical abuse." See Punishing Pregnant Addicts, supra
note 54, at E5, col. 3.
It is apparent that children of women who smoke or drink during pregnancy
suffer "abuse" similar to that endured by the children of illegal drug users. See supra
notes 146-47 and accompanying text. In addition, the debate over the legalization of
drugs such as marijuana and cocaine has recently been reopened. See generally
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of maternal prosecutions, however, because most successful
prosecutions of drug-addicted mothers have been based on laws
prohibiting- the delivery of drugs to a minor;i5 similar statutes
regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages 15 1 and cigarettes 52 to
minors. If the schoolyard crack dealer and the pregnant crack
addict may be prosecuted under the same statute, there is no reason
why the liquor store clerk who sells to an underage customer and
the pregnant alcoholic should not face the same liability under an
analogous statute. Perhaps such prosecutions will follow as the
logical extension of the current prosecutorial trend. That this has
not yet occurred may be symptomatic of the nation's rage and
desperation in the face of a seemingly intractable drug epidem-
ic-such strong emotions are not engendered by the health epidem-
ics of smoking and drinking. In addition, addiction to drugs,
especially crack, is perceived as a plague of the urban poor whereas
"everyone" smokes and drinks. If prosecutions for the fetal effects
of drugs are aimed at the middle class, society's attitude toward
these prosecutions may change.1
53
IV. DRUG TREATMENT: AN ALTERNATIVE TO CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION
Increasing the availability of drug treatment programs tailored
to the needs of women would more humanely and effectively
address the problem of drug-exposed babies. Prosecutors have
asserted that their goals are to get mothers into drug rehabilitation
programs and to foster the birth of healthy babies. 154  Indeed,
women convicted of delivering drugs to their babies prenatally may
France, Should We Fight or Switch, 76 A.B.A.J. (1990) (questioning the utility of the
war on drugs). If these drugs were legalized, there would be no ground for maternal
prosecutions based on the illegality of substances used during pregnancy, in the
absence of specific statutes directed at pregnant women.
150 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13(1)(c) (West 1976 & Supp. 1989) (making it
"unlawful for any person 18 years of age or older to deliver any controlled substance
to a person under the age of 18 years").
151 See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 04.16.051 (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-241
(1989).
152 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-3 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-27-227 (1987);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 859.06 (West 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-171 (1988).
153 Evidence indicates that the incidence of crack use by middle-class urban and
suburban whites is increasing. See supra note 137. For a discussion of the
discriminatory nature of current prosecutions, see supra text accompanying notes 133-
38.
154 See supra notes 110 & 112-13 and accompanying text.
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be sentenced to attend drug treatment programs.1 5 5 Ironically,
a criminal conviction may be required to help these women obtain
the social services that they are unable to avail themselves of by
choice.
1 5 6
Pregnant addicts who seek drug treatment face frustration when
they confront an overburdened social welfare system that is largely
unresponsive to their needs. Women are routinely turned away
from programs that exclude pregnant women, pregnant women on
Medicaid, or pregnant crack abusers on Medicaid.1 57  Many
residential treatment programs will not permit mothers to keep
their children with them, 5 8 thereby forcing a woman to forgo
either treatment or her children. Many choose to delay treat-
ment, because they fear the consequences of relinquishing their
children to the welfare system. 159 The failure of many programs
to accommodate children is one facet of the male orientation of
most programs, 160 . which were designed to serve male convicts
and which have not adjusted their emphasis in response to the
increasing number of female drug addicts.1 6 1 Drug treatment is
often punitive and confrontational, and this style may be particular-
ly ineffective for women: "It's not necessary to humiliate a
substance-abusing woman; she already has lost her self-esteem."
162
The lack of treatment programs for women may lead them to
criminal prosecution despite their best intentions and efforts. One
pregnant heroin addict in Butte County, California, was motivated
by fear of fetal harm to seek drug treatment 6 3 and, through
persistence and determination, she gained admittance to an
outpatient methadone maintenance clinic in Sacramento. After
155 See supra text accompanying note 12.
116 See Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs: Governmental Regulation of Pregnant
Women's Lives After Webster, 138 Uf PA. L. REv. 179, 214-15 (1989); Hoffman, supra
note 2, at 57 ("Why is it that we have to make women criminals before we can get
them drug treatment?" (quoting AGLU attorney Kary Moss)).
157 See Diesenhouse, Drug Treatment is Scarcer Than Ever for Women, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 7, 1990, at E26, col. 1. In November of 1989, the ACLU Women's Rights Project
filed a lawsuit on behalf of women who had been refused admission to drug
treatment programs in New York. See Paltrow, supra note 6, at 47 n.45.
158 Only 50 of about 7,000 programs nationwide provide child and obstetric care
to female patients. See Paltrow, supra note 6, at 47 n.45.
I'9 See Tracy, Women SufferMost From Drugs, Phila. Inquirer, Nov. 27, 1988, at 7E,
col. 1.
160 See id.
161 See Diesenhouse, supra note 157, at E20, col. 3.
162 Tracy, supra note 159, at 7E, col. 3.
16s See One Drug-Using Mother's Sto~y, supra note 110.
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months of attending the program, which required her to travel 140
miles round trip each day, she fell behind in her payments and lost
her only available means of transportation. Following sound
medical advice, she went back to using heroin, because a sudden
withdrawal from drugs might have been fatal to her fetus. Soon
after she gave birth and discussed her drug problem with hospital
personnel, her baby was taken away from her by Child Protective
Services and the district attorney announced plans to prosecute
her.164  If this woman had been able to attend an affordable
treatment program close to her home, she might have overcome her
drug problem, kept her baby, and not been subject to prosecution.
Successful treatment programs for women must provide residen-
tial care for mothers and children. One such program is New
Image, "a therapeutic community for homeless, addicted women
and their children" 165 in Philadelphia. This program reported a
dropout rate of 50% in its first year of operation, which is lower
than expected. 6 6 Parenting training, psychological assessments,
and a series of workshops on development of life skills and job-
readiness complement drug therapy at this program. 67  Other
innovative community programs have been developed in Miami, Los
Angeles, and Chicago.' 68 Pending federal legislation may increase
funding for drug treatment programs designed to serve women
addicts, especially during pregnancy.
169
164 See id.
165 NEW IMAcE NEWSLETTER, Spring 1990, at I (on file with the author).
166 See id. at 6.
167 See id.
168 See Larsen, supra note 126, at 53.
169 One bill proposes a $7 million grant program to establish at least five model
residential treatment programs for addicted mothers and their children, allowing
federal funds previously appropriated for waiting-list reduction to be used to provide
treatment services to pregnant and post-partum women, and establishing the National
Resource and Information Center for Perinatal Addiction. See S. 2649, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1990). Another includes provisions to 1) establish a $120 million "family
preservation program" providing grants to states for multidisciplinary services for
families at risk of drug and alcohol abuse; 2) expand Medicaid to cover non-hospital
residential and outpatient drug and alcohol treatment and related case management
for Medicaid-eligible women of childbearing age; 3) give drug- or alcohol-exposed
children priority in Head Start programs; and 4) order the Department of Education
to expand special education programs to cover pre-school and elementary school
children born affected by alcohol or drugs. See S. 2559, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
Still another includes provisions to establish a $200 million grant program to fund
inpatient, outpatient, and residential treatment programs for pregnant and post-
partum women. At least 40% of the funds must go to residential programs where
60% of the women are in treatment under court or agency order. See S. 2505, 101st
PROSECUTION OF MOTHERS
V. CONCLUSION
The recent wave of prosecutions of women who deliver drug-
exposed babies represents a flawed approach to a critical social
problem. These prosecutions flagrantly violate the Constitution by
denying defendants their due process rights of notice and fair
warning. Moreover, the prosecutions representjudicial enlargement
of existing statutes without regard for legislative intent or for the
legislature's role in defining crimes. In addition; women's rights
have been further eroded by these prosecutions as courts follow
Webster's lead in asserting a compelling interest in fetal well-being
that may come at the expense of women's health and welfare.
Criminal theory is also flouted by, the current prosecutions:
involuntary behavior is punished, the major goal of deterrence is
not promoted, and criminogenesis results as the criminal justice
system intrudes into the realm of medical and social services.
The moral outrage and prosecutorial resources aimed at women
whose children are drug-exposed may be more effective if directed
against the conditions that breed drug abuse and against the
suppliers of drugs who essentially prey on the insatiable needs of
addicts. A reduction in the available supply of drugs, coupled with
education about the harmfulness of drugs, would be a more humane
and potentially successful approach to this intractable problem.
There is a dearth of drug treatment facilities for the poor, especially
for pregnant crack addicts. If such services were provided without
resort to criminalization and prosecution, more women might
overcome their drug habits while suffering no infringement of their
constitutional rights. The solution to the social tragedy of drug use
by pregnant women does not lie in strained interpretations of the
law that create more harm than good,
Cong., 1st Sess. (1990). Finally, a fourth proposes the establishment of a $50 million
grant program to fund pilot projects in five states providing outreach, education, and
treatment services to pregnant and post-partum women and their infants. See S. 1444,
101st Cong. (1989). To receive funding, states must require health care providers to
report "substance abused" infants, criminalize giving birth to one, and require a
mandatory three-year rehabilitation sentence to women convicted of this crime. See
id.
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